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I. Introduction1 
The political and economic collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union has created enormous challenge for Western democracies. The challenge has been 
not that of providing financial developmental aid although it is very important for countries 
facing the double challenge of transition and development. Its most important dimension has 
been to provide active policy support to implement reforms dismantling central planning. This in 
turn includes designing and providing a stimulus to implement a viable transition strategies and 
establishing market friendly institutions. Thus, the question is the extent to which Western 
assistance has made a difference in the course of transition from economic systems based on 
central planning to those based on competitive markets. 
This paper examines links between the economic transition in the former Soviet bloc 
countries (including states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union) and Western 
assistance. Its main focus is on addressing two specific questions: (i) have the Western 
governments and international institutions supported the most effective strategy of transition in 
Eastern Europe and FSU?; and (ii) what kind of aid policy can give the best results in terms of 
recipient countries commitment to effective transition strategy? 
Some aspects directly relevant to these two questions have been extensively discussed 
under the label of the so-called shock therapy versus gradualism. Proponents of the latter argued in 
favor of a gradual dismantling of vestiges of central planning, whereas those adhering to shock 
approach advocated rapid liberalization of prices and hardening of budget constraint for 
enterprises. The debate climaxed in 1994 when it became apparent that the Russian transition 
has encountered enormous difficulties. The IMF, World Bank, and Western governments were 
accused of making several important policy blunders and providing aid that came too late and 
was ill-targeted [Sachs, 1994a, Sachs, 1994b]. This discussion has clearly pointed to important 
role that Western aid may play in solving economic problems in post-communist countries and 
influencing the political process of taking crucial transition decisions. 
Therefore, the issue of the aid conditionality and sequencing rather than the detailed 
specification of financial flows and aid initiatives strikes one as of particular relevance to assess 
transition strategies. The size and structure of financial flows to transition economies has been 
extensively discussed elsewhere2. Little research has been devoted to the assessment of the role 
that the Western countries and international institutions have played in the transition. While this 
                                                 
1 This paper draws on my two earlier short papers presented at the IIASA Seminar  "The Western 
Assistance to Russia and Eastern Europe", Laxenburg/Austria, November 4-6, 1993; and at the Conference 
"Managing the World Economy. Fifty Years After Bretton Woods", Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC, May 19-21, 1994. The first version of this paper (under the title "The Role of the International 
Agencies and the West in the Post-Communist Transition: Some Selected Aspects" was presented at the American 
Economic Association Convention in Washington, DC, January 7, 1995.  
The Policy Research Department, Transition Economies Division of the World Bank provided me with the 
excellent technical opportunities for preparing this study. I am very grateful to Alan Gelb for many interesting 
suggestions. Stanley Fischer inspired me to carry out this research. Stimulating discussions with Jeffrey Sachs about 
the Russia’s transition helped me to clarify my own position in relation to aid strategy. Bartłomiej Kamiński, Anders 
Ĺslund, Stanisław Gomułka and Lucjan Orłowski gave me very helpful comments to the first, conference version 
of this paper. Bartłomiej Kamiński helped me also with preparing the publication version. Paper reflects, however, 
the author’s personal opinions only. They should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Board of Directors, its 
management, or any of its member countries. Author takes also solely the responsibility for the quality of this 
paper. 
2 See, for example, OECD reports [OECD, 1994a; OECD, 1994b], annual reports of IMF and World Bank 
as well as a a very interesting study by Kaminski and Wang [1995].  Marek Dąbrowski 
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topic is of mostly historical relevance for those countries which have already established the 
foundations of a market economy, it is of policy relevance for Western assistance of FSU 
countries which are yet to start this process. 
The paper answers the question in its title by first discussing unique features of 
postcommunist transition in terms of their effectiveness in achieving a quick switch from central 
planning to markets and spurring economic recovery (Section II). In order to put assistance in 
perspective Section III provides a brief discussion of the scope, size and structure of financial 
assistance by international multilateral institutions (the IMF and World Bank) and bilateral 
donors from OECD countries. Because of the emphasis on policy advice, Section IV is devoted 
to the assessment of technical assistance, i.e., guidance on economic reform measures. The next 
two sections deal with the use of conditionality in programs financed by the IMF and the World 
Bank. The last section is an attempt to link assistance, and assess its significance, to specific 
features and stages of the transition. Finally, the last section presents general conclusions and 
recommendations. 
The analysis in this paper offers strong support to the following conclusions. First, by far 
the most important actor in providing assistance during the early stages of the transition is the 
IMF. IMF-funded programs have played a pivotal role in stimulating each country transition 
strategy. Apart from macroeconomic significance, its programs provided a strong boost to 
genuinely-committed reformers in transition economies. Once the goals of economic 
stabilization are achieved, other actors have the potential to play in institution-developing and 
sectoral problems. 
Second, contrary to a popular view both in the West and post-communist countries that 
the multilateral institutions have emphasized too much budget cutting and austerity measures, 
the examination of IMF and World Bank lending record suggests a different picture. In fact, too 
often conditionalities imposed by the IMF or the World Bank have in fact encouraged adoption 
of a wrongheaded gradualist approach to macroeconomic stabilization especially in countries of 
the FSU (former Soviet Union). The experience of transition economies demonstrates that only 
radical and comprehensive approach results in stabilization and economic recovery. 
Third, conditionality contained in many assistance programs was often too soft. Since 
relatively few countries enjoy sufficient internal consensus and sufficient determination of the 
part of the new political elites not only to start the serious reforms but also to continue them in a 
credible manner, it is perhaps the most important aspect of external assistance. Too often 
Western donors would forget that tough external conditionality can help reformers politically in 
the region and reduce political and social cost of transition. 
Fourth, the quality of technical assistance varied by source. Advise offered by the 
international financial institutions and most of Western experts (both governmental and non-
governmental) have been usually adequate to the task of transition with the exception of an ill-
conceived recommendation to support the ruble zone in the former Soviet Union in 1992. 
 
II. Post-Communist Transition and Its Strategy 
The post-communist transition is a complex endeavor affecting almost all aspects of the 
economic and political system. Because of its scale, it differs from both other historical cases Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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such as German and Japanese post-war reconstruction and even the most complex policy 
reforms in developing countries [Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Balcerowicz, 1994] 3.  
In the economic sphere the new democratic governments inherited problems that would 
determine the agenda of the transition. In a nutshell, they had to built markets from scratch: As 
Balcerowicz [1994] has noted "under communist rule [...] capitalism was destroyed and not merely suspended 
(as in Germany before 1948) or distorted (as in Latin America and India before their respective rounds of 
economic liberalization)." Consider that communism lasted more than 40 years in Central and 
Eastern Europe including the Baltic countries and more than 70 years in the other parts of FSU. 
From the view-point of transition, one may identify three most important potential 
obstacles inherited from communism. These include: first, total or almost total nationalization of 
the economy have left a very limited role for private saving and implied either explicit 
prohibition or serious restrictions on private economic activity. To make matters worse, the 
official systems of education and propaganda tried to convince people of the superiority of state 
(sometimes referred to as "social" or "all-national") over private ownership.  
Second, huge structural distortions stemming from the monopolization, economic autarky, 
administrative price regulation, and centralized investment decisions. The former communist 
economies were strongly oriented to domestic and regional markets (the latter through the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and were more or less separated from other markets 
by currency inconvertibility, price controls, trade restrictions, and the state monopoly in foreign 
trade. 
Third, domestic and external macroeconomic disequilibrium prevailed and was especially 
strong in the last years of the communist regimes, during which they lost their capacity to 
control economic and social life. Only the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the former 
German Democratic Republic avoided dramatic macroeconomic crises, but even in these 
countries (and especially in Hungary) the degree of macroeconomic stability was far off the 
Western standards.  
To deal effectively with these legacies of central planning, post-communist reformers have 
had to address simultaneously three domains: (a) macro-economic stabilization, (b) liberalization 
(deregulation) connected with the change in the system of economic institutions and (c) 
privatization and restructuring. 
The experience covering now a period of more than five years offers valuable lessons 
about the best transition strategy. The available comparative analyses amply demonstrate 
superiority of a radical, fast and comprehensive variant of transition strategy over other 
approaches [Ĺslund, 1994; Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1994; Gelb, de Melo and Denizer, 1995; 
Dąbrowski, 1995]. It shows that from the outset it was a false dilemma. Only the radical and 
comprehensive reform packages may prevent economic and political crisis, and create prospects 
for economic recovery. In its best variant, the gradual strategy (such as Hungary) only extends 
the duration of economic contraction and produce positive results later than the radical ones 
would have. In its worse variant such as exercised in Romania, Russia, Ukraine or Belarus, it 
fosters macroeconomic mismanagement and, often, a deep political crisis.  
The more detailed analysis shows that the heated debate on shock therapy versus 
gradualism does not make sense at all, simply because it abstracts from the nature of the 
individual components of the transition package. For example, the slow and gradual 
macroeconomic stabilization is not a viable policy especially for countries which entered the 
                                                 
3 Chile’s transition was probably the most comprehensive and radical outside the former communist block. 
But even Chilean transformation of 1970s and 1980s seems less revolutionary in terms of scope and depth of 
needed change than that in post-communist countries. Marek Dąbrowski 
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transition process with a big monetary overhang and substantial fiscal and monetary imbalances. 
The rationality of slow price and trade liberalization is also very doubtful with a possible 
exception of countries which had more open and deregulated economies before the post-
communist transition started and inherited less price and structural distortions (Hungary, former 
Yugoslavia). The real choice concerns the speed of privatization, more sophisticated institutional 
changes, and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises. However, most of available arguments 
(the danger of regulatory and ownership vacuum, negative implications of government 
interventionism for monetary and fiscal policies, credibility issue and danger of political 
bargaining and rent-seeking, risk of loosing the unique political window opportunity after 
collapse of communism, etc.) support fast microeconomic restructuring and privatization rather 
than a slow one [Balcerowicz, 1994; Dąbrowski, 1995].  
III. Review of Official Financial Aid 
Financial assistance includes a variety of forms of support: IMF and World Bank loans 
(including International Finance Corporation projects), EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) loans and investment, grants from the European Union 
under the PHARE and TACIT programs, initiatives of the G-7 and the G-24, bilateral support, 
trade credits, humanitarian aid, debt rescheduling and reduction agreements with the Paris and 
London clubs, and others. Also private capital flows play a very important role. To make the 
picture complete it would be necessary to analyze also capital outflow from the transition 
countries, especially private capital outflow from the FSU. Because of limited space and low 
reliability of data I will focus on official capital flows to Central and Eastern Europe, and to the 
FSU - coming from the IMF and World Bank as well as the bilateral OECD official aid 4. 
The IMF support to the transition countries involves basically two types of programs: 
stand-by arrangements (SBA) and systemic transformation facility (STF). Whereas SBA, in some 
sense the standard IMF adjustment program, has been used mainly by the Central and Eastern 
European countries, and Baltic countries, the STF window was created specially for the FSU 
countries in the beginning of 1993 and extensively exploited by most of them. However, also the 
slower or delayed (for different reasons) reformers in the Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia, and even Slovakia) benefited from the STF. Marginally, other types 
of programs were also adopted: the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Poland and Hungary in 
1991 (both unsuccessful) and recently for Lithuania, the first tranche credit for Russia in 1992, 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) for Albania and Mongolia in 1993, and 
Kyrgyzstan in 1994, Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility for Poland in 1991 (as 
the component of EFF) and Moldova in 1993. Currently the new idea of the Currency 
Stabilization Funds, being de facto a kind of second SBA, is being discussed by the IMF Executive 
Board. 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the size and structure of the IMF financial assistance to the 
economies in transition in the period of 1990-1994. So far governments of all countries that have 
made a credible commitment to start the real transition process could use IMF financial facilities. 
Some others (such as Uzbekistan) are expecting for finalizing the STF negotiations in the early 
1995. Countries that have not used IMF financing are in most cases engaged in military conflicts 
or have not started real reforms yet.  
During the last five years IMF has approved programs for transition economies amounted 
to around 11.5 billions SDR, out of that 3,372.385 millions SDR were approved and disbursed 
under the STF and 8,154.87 millions SDR were accepted under SBA, EFF, ESAF and CCFF 
                                                 
4 For an in-depth analysis of private capital flows, especially foreign direct investment - see Kaminski and 
Wang, 1995. Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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windows. However, only 3,307.25 millions SDR (40.6% of the total approved amount) were 
disbursed until April 30, 1994. Some programs barely began and subsequent tranches of loans 
will be given recipient countries according to agreed schedule and in dependence on results of 
programs reviews. Part of programs accepted in the past (such as EFF for Poland and Hungary 
in 1991) was stopped or suspended because recipient countries missed the performance criteria. 
The IMF lending rules (the size of financial assistance regulated by the system of quotas) 
make distribution of financial support quite proportional to the size of country and its economic 
potential. Some exemptions in plus can be explained by the early start of cooperation with IMF 
(Poland, Hungary) or by the political will to be closely monitored by this organization 
(Lithuania). Exemptions in minus, apart earlier mentioned few cases of countries not prepared 
for cooperation with IMF, concern mainly countries in the relatively good macroeconomic 
situation not interested in implementing the typical adjustment programs (Czech Republic, 
Slovenia).  
The IMF financial aid can be used mainly for balance of payments support and building up 
the official international reserves. Part of the STF money can also support indirectly state 
budget. 
The World Bank provides the member countries with three types of loans: general loans, 
supporting balance of payment and indirectly (through counterpart funds) state budget, sectoral 
adjustment loans. Table 3 illustrates first type of loans, i.e. SAL, rehabilitation loans, recovery 
loans, and the critical import loans, approved for the transition economies in a period from the 
beginning of 1990 to the beginning of 1994. Table 4 contains data concerning sectoral loans 
related mainly to the financial sector and restructuring (for a period 1990-1994). Table 5 gives 
information about all other sectoral and project loans approved in the fiscal years 1988-1994.  
Although periods of data in each table are not fully compatible we can try to summarize 
the total amount of the World Bank financial assistance to countries in transition during last 5 
years. It gives amount ca. 12 billions USD. Only 3,758 millions (31.4% of total amount) were 
addressed for general needs, i.e. balance of payment and budget support. The rest of them was 
covered by sectoral and project loans5. I do not dispose the full disbursement data. However, the 
average level of disbursement usually did not exceed 50-60% during the first year after the 
approval by the World Bank Board. This happens mainly due to three factors. First, most of the 
lending projects include sequencing (disbursement in several tranches) depended on fulfilling the 
policy conditions specified in the loan agreement. Second, the World Bank money can be spent 
only according to the established procurement procedures. Third, general capacity of economies 
in transition to accommodate the World Bank loans in the effective way is very limited (see 
below). 
Tables 3-5 show also more geographical concentration than in the case of IMF financial 
assistance. Two definite leaders, Hungary and Poland, represent countries with the longest 
experience in cooperation with the World Bank, and the best technically prepared to a very time 
consuming and bureaucratic process of loan negotiation. 
Tables 6 give us a picture on official aid given by governments of 21 OECD countries 
being member of Development Assistance Committee in the period 1990-19936. The aid 
statistics includes both bilateral assistance and contribution to the programs carried out by the 
                                                 
5 However, the part of sectoral loans can be used for financing the budget expenditures, for example in 
education and health service. 
6 Among other OECD members Turkey has provided the substantial assistance to the Central Asia 
countries and Azerbaijan. It amounted 111 million USD (0.07% GDP) in 1991, 171 million USD (0.11% GDP) in 
1992 and 260 million USD (0.15% GDP) in 1993. Marek Dąbrowski 
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international organization such as European Community or EBRD. The picture presented in 
tables 7-8 (geographical distribution and sectoral structure of aid) is not complete. It covers fully 
only two years - 1991 and 1992. It does not contain the export credit statistics7, and 
consequently - private capital flows.  
However, even so incomplete a statistical picture leads to three firm observations. First, 
the total size of official financial aid to the economies in transition has been extremely small - it 
amounts to 0.04% of GDP of the DAC countries. It is far less then the size of development 
assistance received by the developing countries (60 billions USD in 1992 - see OECD [1994], 
p.3). In addition, the financial aid to transition economies has been on the decrease reaching its 
maximum in 1991. Austria, Germany and Sweden (from 1992 when the Baltic countries started 
their transition) are the only three countries which made a more substantial and regular effort 
transferring to transition countries around 0.2% of their GDP.8  
Second, the composition of aid changed significantly each year. Apart some regular trends 
(decreasing share of food aid, increasing importance of project and program grants), there were 
also occasional blimps such as the reduction of the Polish official debt in 1991-1992. 
Third, we observe a very big asymmetry in geographical distribution of aid. Poland, as a 
leader of the economic and political transformation, has received the biggest financial assistance 
(especially if we include both debt reduction operations here) in both relative and absolute terms 
(i.e., taking into consideration the size of the national economy). This was mainly due to the 
earlier mentioned official debt reduction decided by the Paris Club in April 1991.9 Albania was 
the second biggest recipient country in relative terms. From 1992 one can observe the evident 
shift of aid from CEE to FSU (mainly Baltics and Russia). Hungary, although a significant 
recipient of IMF and World Bank lending programs, received less bilateral assistance. This 
country never asked for debt rescheduling or debt reduction. Czecho-Slovakia and its successors 
(especially the Czech Republic) received considerably less than Poland and Hungary partly 
because they have never applied for it and partly because they were in a far better 
macroeconomic situation (balanced budget, small public debt, the lack of balance of payment 
problems). Bulgaria can be seen as opposite extreme to Poland - despite its very ambitious 
stabilization and liberalization program in 1991, it received little external assistance. Debt 
reduction came only in July 1994. Bulgaria was the last East European CMEA country who 
received association agreement with the European Community. Furthermore, this country was 
hurt by a series of adverse external shocks - the collapse of CMEA trade in 1991, the Gulf crisis 
in 1990-1991 (in both cases Bulgaria was more depended on this trade than other CMEA 
countries), and finally by the UN economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. It seems that those 
unfavorable external factors are at least partly responsible for the crisis of the ambitious 
transition program in Bulgaria. 
Among the FSU countries in the first two years of transition (1992-93) only Russia and the 
Baltic states seemed to have attracted the attention of the G-7 group, the G-24 group as well as 
the Bretton Woods institutions. The other new independent states of the FSU have received far 
                                                 
7 Because of some metological problems with its presentation. 
8 It is worthy to remember that Germany had to make in the same time a huge effort financing the East 
German transition. 
9 As far as private debt-related assistance is concerned, two recent operations carried out in 1994 by the 
London Club representing the private banks are noteworthy. Bulgaria received in July 1994 a 46% reduction of the 
commercial debt (3.8 billions USD out of 8.1 billions USD). Poland signed the agreement with London Club 
creditors in September 1994 receiving 47-49% debt reduction (6.8 - 7.0 billions USD out of 14.4 billions USD). 
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less support, partly because they were not prepared to undertake serious reforms (e.g. Ukraine 
and Belarus as well as the countries involved in military conflicts), and partly because they have 
probably been perceived by the West as politically less important. CIS countries received in 1992 
and in the first half of 1993 far more real economic aid from Russia than from the West. In the 
situation when the ruble area still existed the Central Bank of Russia (and later the Russian 
government) financed almost automatically the negative trade balances of FSU countries with 
Russia. Those countries were also supplied by Russia with oil and gas at prices far below the 
world level [Dąbrowski, 1993; Granville and Lushin, 1993; Hernandez-Cata, 1993] 10.  
From the second half of 1993 the situation started to change radically - both earlier 
mentioned forms of the Russian assistance started to decline quickly, together with the final 
collapse of the ruble area and the gradual adjustment of oil and gas prices in real terms (however, 
this last factor did not disappear completely). CIS countries had to start more serious reforms 
and real macroeconomic adjustment. They became the more serious clients of Bretton Woods 
institutions, especially IMF. Kyrgyzstan and Moldova were the first, later joined by Kazakhstan 
and recently by Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia. The reorientation of Russian foreign and 
internal policy (less willingness to cooperate with the West, intervention in Chechnya) and the 
evident crisis of Russian economic and political reforms seems to shift additionally the attention 
of G-7 from this country to other post Soviet states. 
Looking at the main forms of the Western financial aid to the transition countries it seems 
obvious that this aid does not meet expectations of the potential recipients. The problem 
concerns not only the size of financial flows but a better targeting the existing aid. Countries in 
transition, at least during the first years, need general balance of payments and budget support 
(connected, of course, with strong conditionality - see section V). Unfortunately, major part of 
aid has been in the form of commercial credits (for the specific import items from a donor 
country) or project financing from the World Bank and EBRD. The well targeted sectoral and 
project financing is very important for the long term restructuring of the economy. However, at 
the initial stage of transition the capacity to absorb this kind of aid is limited. Unless the 
macroeconomic stabilization is really successful and hard budget constraints start to function the 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) are not interested in borrowing, because of uncertain financial 
prospects. The private sector is still weak and also not prepared to borrow without excessive 
risk. The banking sector is under restructuring and cannot guarantee effective intermediation. 
On the other hand, when the stabilization is not successful and financial environment is still soft, 
the credit absorption can go formally more smoothly but without any real chances for repaying 
debt in the future. 
Most of commercial credits and project loans given by the bilateral donors or international 
financial institutions is subject to financial guarantees of the government of a recipient country. 
It means the continuation of government involvement in the direct economic and investment 
activity and difficulties to make budget constraints for SOEs really tight. Generally, commercial 
credits (for specific import) do not solve economic problems of recipient countries but, contrary, 
are rather a by-product of agriculture or industrial interventionism in the donor country.  
IV. Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance is usually provided in two areas: (i) advice on the general concepts of 
economic reform, and (ii) advice on specific technical aspects of the transition process. It can be 
provided by the international organizations (IMF, World Bank, IFC, UNDP, EBRD, OECD, 
                                                 
10 Both factors were also partly present in Russia economic relations with the Baltic countries. Marek Dąbrowski 
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European Union, etc.), governments of the donor countries, and non-government organizations 
and voluntary initiatives11. 
The first wave of reforming countries - including Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Russia, Estonia, and Latvia - have designed their reforms autonomously with 
only a supplementary support from foreign experts, including IMF and World Bank experts. 
International organizations and Western governments experts could play a greater role in 
designing a general transition strategy for countries that have delayed reform when the latter do 
not have enough experts of their own to do the job. It concerns mainly FSU countries apart 
from Russia and the Baltics. Non-governmental academic experts can also be useful here. 
Almost all the former communist countries have sought assistance in solving their specific 
technical problems. The organization of the central bank, the use of monetary instruments, the 
organization of capital markets, tax reform and administration, privatization, and the keeping of 
national statistics are only few of the areas where help is needed. This kind of assistance is 
especially important in the former Soviet Union, where few market institutions have survived the 
communist period. The former Soviet republics must also in many cases build the standard 
institutions of independent states from the ground up. 
The direction and quality of technical assistance given by the international financial 
institutions and most of Western experts (both governmental and non-governmental) have been 
in general adequate to the nature and scale of the problems of the transition. However, some 
specific mistakes were made. Probably the most important was the attempt to support the ruble 
zone in the former Soviet Union in 1992. Another relates to the reluctance of IMF and Western 
experts to the idea of a fixed exchange rate regime, especially in countries with strong 
inflationary inertia and very low demand for domestic currency. Finally, the dearth of ideas how 
to organize the privatization process in the relatively fast and politically acceptable manner was 
the common weakness of most of experts both Western and domestic12.  
While guidelines of IMF, World Bank. IFC, OECD or EBRD policy advise can be seen as 
generally relevant to the real challenge of transition (apart few exemptions mentioned above) the 
position taken by some other UN agencies, especially by the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe in Geneva have raised serious objections. The latter has permanently opposed the idea 
of radical, comprehensive and internally consistent transition package, trying to neglect the 
importance of tight macroeconomic policy and radical liberalization and promoting a very 
doubtful gradualist strategy. Fortunately, the real influence of this body in the policy advising 
sphere was rather symbolic.  
The effectiveness of using the technical assistance by the recipient countries is another big 
issue which deserves at least a short comment. Some disappointment is a quite common feeling 
among both experts who are involved in the policy advising (especially in FSU countries), and 
politicians and public opinion in the recipient countries13. What are the reasons for it? 
                                                 
11 The enormous role of George Soros and his network of charity foundations should be underlined among 
the last group of initiatives. The Soros-funded organizations support a lot of policy advising and educational activity 
in the post-communist world as well as democratic organizations and research institutes involved in the political 
and economic transformation..  
12 However, the last experience with the Rehabilitation Loan negotiations for Ukraine in November 1994, 
when the World Bank experts pressed very much for adoption of the comprehensive, fast, and really mass 
privatization program by Ukrainian government, shows that World Bank draw serious lessons from hitherto 
privatization experience.  
13 I have had the unique personal opportunity to learn this problem from both sides. My first experience 
with foreign advisors was connected with my role in the Polish transition process and had a passive character (i.e. I Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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First, it is the lack of sufficient political determination to implement radical economic 
reforms in several countries. Sometimes even if the leading reformers declare the intention to go 
quickly (as Egor Gaidar in Russia in the end of 1991) they do not have sufficient political 
support and real policy is neither radical nor consistent sufficiently. In this situation the role of 
foreign advisers is limited from the very beginning. They serve sometimes either as the substitute 
of a serious transition policy (especially in relation with Western government and international 
institutions) or as the victims whom unsuccessful politicians can blame publicly. 
Second, poor organization of government and the entire state administration is a quite 
universal situation in the transition economies with enormous concentration of this kind of 
problems in the FSU and less severe situation in Central Europe, especially in Czech Republic 
and Hungary. It is one of the most dramatic legacies of the communist regime which influences 
negatively the speed and effectiveness of all economic and political transition [see Ĺslund, 1994]. 
It creates, of course, also serious difficulties to organize work of foreign advisers, specify 
demand for their services, and implement smoothly their recommendations.  
Third, sometimes one may observe strong political reservations as to the role of foreign 
advisers. They are isolated from the real policy discussions, decision making process, important 
information. Their suggestions are seen with suspicion. It happens especially in some FSU 
countries where former communist hostility to Western "imperialist" penetration, spying 
obsession, etc. are still alive. Sometimes extreme nationalist feelings strengthen this 
phenomenon. The common neocommunist and nationalist rhetoric blaming IMF, World Bank 
and other "imperialist" influence can effectively affect views of the significant part of post-
communist societies. The anti-foreigners attitude and restrictions in relation to external advisers 
are sometimes connected with the deep incompetence and corrupted practices of post-
communist administration that is not interested to open its "secretes" to the people from the 
outside.  
Fourth, there is also a lot of problems on the foreign experts’ side, especially in the case of 
advisers coming not from international organizations. Outbursts of occasional, short-term visits 
of experts, sometimes competing one with other, who never were engaged before in the post-
communist transition are not usually helpful for hosts. A lot of time have to be devoted to give 
visiting experts the basic information about a country, its economy and implemented reforms 
without chances to receive any valuable output. The international experience shows that full time 
advisers permanently staying in the recipient country are the most productive. Part time regular 
advising (e.g. one week every month) is the second best. It can be also effective if advisors has 
permanent access to necessary data and information and if they have some junior staff working 
for him on place. In some cases earlier prepared short visits of consultants invited to solve 
specific, rather narrow and well defined problems can be seen as exemption of the above rule. 
What concerns professional skills, apart theoretical knowledge, some practical experience 
in policy making or at least in policy advising can increase significantly expert’s productivity. The 
earlier contacts with recipient country are helpful but not necessary. At least passive knowledge 
of the domestic language seems also to be very important. The active knowledge of this language 
allows to work together with domestic politicians, civil servants and experts without intervention 
of interpreter. Experts if want to be really effective should also learn something about history of 
the country, its culture, ethnic relations as well as try to follow current political events. 
The above described difficulties does not undermine general rationality of the foreign 
technical assistance. They only prove that in some transition countries it is rather difficult to 
expect immediate positive results. However, even in these less hopeless and most frustrating 
                                                                                                                                                         
was recipient of foreign assistance). My second experience is connected with my active role as a foreign consultant 
in Russia (1991-1994), Ukraine (from 1993) and Kyrgyzstan (from 1993).  Marek Dąbrowski 
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cases the consequence and patience in advisory and education activity brings positive effects 
after some period. The most evident example is Ukraine.  
There is increasing understanding among FSU countries that only quick, radical and quite 
complex reforms can allow them to find a way-out from the deep economic and political crisis. 
Even countries which are in very unfavorable political conditions (military conflicts) such as 
Armenia or Georgia have become ready to enter a way of serious transition effort. It means that 
demand for technical assistance will probably increase in the next years.  
V. Conditionality 
Conditionality is perhaps the most important aspect of external assistance. Relatively few 
countries enjoy sufficient internal consensus and sufficient determination of the part of the new 
political elites not only to start the serious reforms but also to continue them in a consequent 
way. It needs to make a lot of unpopular decisions and permanently avoid populist pressures. 
Poland was one of these fortunate countries (but only in the first two years of transition); others 
were Czecho-Slovakia (and later the Czech Republic), Estonia, Latvia, and probably Albania. In 
all other countries a kind of external pressure, coming mainly from IMF conditionality, was and 
remains very helpful in keeping economic policy (especially its fiscal and monetary components) 
reasonably on track. Tough external conditionality can only politically help reformers in the 
region. 
Has IMF and World Bank played this role forcefully enough? The answer is not simple. 
Even a very brief look at the list of adopted IMF and the World Bank programs (see tables 1-5) 
gives a very ambiguous picture. Aside from many successful or almost successful programs there 
are also a lot of failures. Of course, one can say that a big level of risk is immanently connected 
with this kind of lending. It is true. However, a more careful analysis of both successful and 
unsuccessful stories gives credence to an unfavorable assessment. 
Successful programs were adopted by the Central European and Baltic countries where, as 
it was mentioned earlier, the political consensus and determination was probably sufficient to 
start reforms even before the IMF came with financial support and its conditionality (it was 
exactly the Estonia in 1992). Less optimistic is picture with Eastern European slow reformers 
(Romania, Bulgaria, and recently Slovakia) where IMF accepted programs that did not seem 
credible enough and did not yield the expected results.  
The problem of credibility is a more complex one. It involves not only the purely formal 
content of program, i.e. the declared policy targets and their consistency but also the credibility 
of politicians signing the program. The Western practice that a public declaration of politician is 
the sufficient proof of his commitment to take the specific action is probably not enough in the 
post-communist world where forgetting given promises or even open political cheating happens 
quite often.  
However, the international financial institutions still treat policy declarations as a good 
coin not looking at the reform record of the specific government or political team. Some FSU 
cases are even more evident than Central and Eastern European ones. Russia’s experience with 
"first tranche" credit in mid-1992 and both tranches of STF (July 1993 and April 1994) provides 
the best example. All three agreements were violated by the Russian government and the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation - first two almost as soon as they were signed, third one - after 
half a year. Moreover, all these program based on the very soft targets (see below) and 
probability of their success (even if fully implemented) was very problematic. Yet that did not 
stop the IMF from discussing the stand-by arrangements with Russia based more less on the 
similar policy targets.  Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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Belarus and Kazakhstan can be seen as another examples of this doubtful practice. In 
Belarus the first purchase of STF in August 1993 came exactly in the time when Vyacheslav 
Kebich government lost the control on macroeconomic policy and Prime Minister himself 
started very populist presidential election campaign. It means that IMF de facto supported 
nonreform structural policies and macroeconomic populism in this country. In February 1995 
Belarus received the second purchase of STF and the idea of stand-by program is under serious 
consideration of IMF, although the economic policy of the new Belarusian president and 
government is far from the minimal credibility.  
Kazakhstan is probably a less drastic case. The Kazakh president and government declare 
still the reform orientation and try to make some partial reforms. However, the inflation is still 
very high and general picture of economic reforms does not justify the rationality of combined 
STF and stand-by program. 
The above examples lead us to question the rationality of the STF idea itself. Even if one 
accepts the proposal of extending the content and conditionality of typical IMF macroeconomic 
agreements to systemic arrangements, there are serious doubts as to whether all the conditions 
applied are ambitious enough to make the transition program really effective. STF programs 
usually accept inflation targets at 5 to 10 percent per month and budget deficits around 6 to 10 
percent of GDP. This type of policy does not guarantee the success in fighting with high 
inflation. In contrary, it can lead very easy to the chronic inflationary inertia or even to the 
eruption of hyperinflation. In the unstable macroeconomic environment it is hard to expect also 
the effective privatization and other institutional reforms. The main reason of irrationality of 
such a macroeconomic policy is connected with the extremely low monetization of FSU 
economies. The relation between the broad domestic money and GDP does not exceed 10% 
(Russia, Ukraine) and in some countries amounts only 2-3% (Central Asia, Caucasian countries). 
The second argument is linked with the lack of financial markets what makes the monetization 
of almost all the fiscal deficit (apart the part financed by the foreign aid) unavoidable.  
The official argumentation in favor of STF underlies, apart supporting the institutional and 
structural changes [see e.g. Summers, 1994], its role as a bridge towards SBA and fully blooded 
stabilization policy. The practice, however, does not support this kind of expectations for at least 
two reasons. First and foremost, STF programs support in principle gradualist transition 
strategies despite their demonstrated ineffectiveness both economically and politically (see 
section II). Second, STF programs do not work also as a bridge to SBA. Even, if the second 
purchase of STF is connected with the stand-by, the quality of this second component is not 
high (the example of Kazakhstan). The lending expectations created by the relative easiness of 
STF money lead usually, via political pressure of recipient countries (but sometimes also of G-7 
countries), to softening standard SBA criteria. In several cases (Baltic states, Kyrgyzstan, 
Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria) STF is treated as additional portion of money to SBA concluded 
either earlier or in the same time as STF. Table 2 shows also the case when STF was given to the 
country which had earlier SBA and later, for political reasons, became not able to fulfill the SBA 
criteria (Slovakia in 1993).  
In consequence, the STF became, in practice, an easy money window softening the IMF 
pressure for responsible macroeconomic management and comprehensive reforms. This type of 
policy can lead to a loss of the IMF’s credibility. If there is a political case for giving some special 
(i.e. soft) type of financial assistance outside of traditional IMF rules, it should be given on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis (for example, directly by G-7 governments) rather than through 
IMF and World Bank channels. That would allow the IMF and World Bank to preserve its image 
as a tough institutions - an image that seems to be of important international value. 
Unfortunately, the recent practice (e.g. IMF involvement in solving the Mexican crisis) is going 
exactly in the opposite directions. For the US government and other Western governments 
suffering the domestic fiscal problems is politically far more easier to use the IMF or World Marek Dąbrowski 
CASE Foundation  - 14 - 
Bank "window" than go through complicated procedure of parliamentary appropriation of 
budget spending.  
Experience shows that a policy of "soft" financial assistance, rather than encouraging the 
acceleration of reforms, actually supports communist or national-populist forces. They only 
increase their demands. As result, even these "soft" agreements are not usually fulfilled. Such a 
policy does not help advocates of radical economic reforms who find themselves in a kind of 
intellectual and political isolation. Argument like "even the IMF agrees for a bigger fiscal deficit 
and more monetary expansion" used by the advocates of gradualism undermines the political 
positions of real reformers.  
Last but not least, the soft aid and weak fiscal conditions give also some countries more 
room for military spending or for engaging in aggressive policies towards their neighbors. Such a 
by-product is very undesirable from the point of view of the international security. 
VI. Sequencing 
Aid sequencing is closely connected with the issue of conditionality. The foreign financial 
assistance should come on time, i.e. in the moment when the strategic package of changes is 
launched. The serious technical assistance should come earlier to help recipient country to 
prepare the program of a good quality. In purely economic sense the financial assistance is 
necessary to support fixed exchange rate or even much stronger institutional solution such as 
currency board. The size of this assistance should depend on the size of the economy and initial 
macroeconomic conditions. Some countries have suffered extreme adverse external shocks what 
makes this first decisive package (macroeconomic stabilization and extensive liberalization) 
extremely difficult. This has related, among others, to countries such as Bulgaria and Albania in 
Eastern Europe or Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus in FSU. Countries 
such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, in principle, have more room for 
macroeconomic maneuver because they have rich natural resources more easy tradable on the 
international market than substandard products of manufactured industries.  
Transition experience shows that the political window opportunity for radical and complex 
reform is usually very narrow and short lasting [Balcerowicz, 1994]. Loosing this chance means 
usually entering the long period of permanent political crisis and macroeconomic chaos with a 
big difficulty to find the necessary consensus to adopt the relevant policy measures again. The 
Western aid policy should stimulate the maximal effective using of this political window 
opportunity and support financially the concrete reform package on time.  
In the third section of this paper I mentioned one recent historical case when Western 
support (not only in financial sphere) came too late and in too limited form. It concerns Bulgaria 
in 1991 and 1992. There are also opposite cases when financial support came too early in the 
sense that the credible reform program was not ready yet. I have in mind Russia in last three 
years14 but also part of the earlier mentioned STF programs. As it was said earlier, such a policy 
rather demobilizes political forces from supporting the radical strategy than helps a smooth 
transition.  
In the case of Russia it is absolutely clear that the foreign aid was motivated by some 
calculations connected with the international politics and short term interests of export lobbies 
in the donor countries rather than by any clear idea how to stimulate the real economic transition 
                                                 
14 I present here the completely opposite opinion to the opinion of Jeffrey Sachs who blamed Western 
governments and IMF for coming in 1992 with an assistance to Russia which was too small and too late [see - 
Sachs, 1994a, Sachs, 1994b]. The position simalar to Sachs’s position has been taken publicly several times by 
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to a market economy. The tactical motivation was absolutely clear, for example, in the case of 
Germany interested mainly in a quick repatriation of the Russian troops from former GDR and 
trying find a way of the hidden subsidization of East German enterprises. Similar short term 
calculation one can find also in other G-7 countries, including the United States. De facto such a 
policy was initiated earlier during Gorbachev perestroika when former Soviet Union received 
some ten billions of US dollars of Western financial aid without any conditionality.  
The financial aid is necessary not only in the initial period of reform when the recipient 
government is implementing the decisive stabilization and liberalization package. The transition 
experience shows that if this first stage is successful the new serious problems come. These may 
include a possible second fiscal crisis and difficult to predict problems related to institutional 
restructuring. 
Most of the transition countries after successful stabilization tend to enter the period of a 
second fiscal crisis because of the tax base (especially profit related taxes) shrinking and 
exploding social type expenditures. This is the adequate moment for a temporary external 
support for the budget. This is a more proper time for such aid than during the stage of the 
initial stabilization. During the latter it is quite easy to balance budget, simply removing subsidies 
and tax exemptions (what is connected with price liberalization and unification of the exchange 
rate). If the budget aid comes too early it can only politically derail the necessary fiscal 
adjustment and stop liberalization process. Additionally, through accumulated debt, it can make 
the second fiscal crisis even more severe. The well targeted financial aid with strong 
conditionality can really help transition economies later, in the most difficult fiscal period. 
The emphasis during the later stages of the transition is on institution development, 
restructuring (including banking crisis and privatization) and containing growing social costs of 
these changes. This is an adequate time for sectoral adjustment and project financing proposed 
by the World Bank and other development institutions. This is also time where private capital 
inflows should begin to have more important role in financing the future economic growth.  
VII. Conclusion 
One of the main findings of this analysis is that well-targeted, timed, designed, and 
delivered programs with strong conditionalities are a good substitute for the ￿dollar￿ amounts of 
assistance. The challenge is not that of the size of financial inflows but of insisting on recipient 
governments commitment to implement economic reform measures and observe 
macroeconomic fundamentals. While immediately after the collapse of communism, there was 
some uncertainty as to what policies and in what sequence should be followed, the experience of 
the last five years has largely removed this incertitude. 
Yet, despite consensus among economists and analysts of the transition from communism 
on what policies and approaches work, there is a remarkable timidity displayed by bilateral 
donors and international financial organizations to impose policy conditionality and execute their 
implementation. The experience amply demonstrates that only comprehensive and radical policy 
package can help overcome economic and political crisis. Western governments and 
international institutions have a stake in supporting a radical and comprehensive strategy of post-
communist transition. While it is quite common not only in the Eastern Europe and FSU to 
criticize the IMF and World Bank for being too tough and putting too much emphasis on 
macroeconomic stabilization [see e.g. Nuti and Portes, 1993], the analysis of the lending record 
of both institutions gives the opposite picture: they can be blamed for being too soft in many 
cases (especially in the FSU) and for supporting de facto the gradualist strategy of transition. 
The timing of assistance is of crucial importance. If financial assistance comes too late, the 
political momentum for the radical reforms can be lost. However, the same may happen if it Marek Dąbrowski 
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comes too early, before building up the necessary political consensus around radical reforms. 
Moreover, the "soft", i.e. weakly conditioned aid creates irrational expectations and erodes the 
reform determination in countries where such a determination is generally not easy to achieve. Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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Table 1: IMF financial assistance to the transition economies (SBA, EFF and ESAF) - from May 
1, 1989 until December 15, 1994, (in millions of SDRs) 










Hungary SBA  03/14/90  02/20/91  159.21 127.37 
Hungary EFF  02/20/91  09/15/93  1,114.00 557.23 
Hungary SBA  09/15/93  12/14/94  340.00 56.70 
Yugoslavia SBA  03/16/90  09/15/91  460.00 65.70 
Croatia   SBA  10/14/94  04/13/96  65.00 * 
Poland SBA  02/05/90  03/04/91  545.00 357.50 
Poland EFF  04/18/91  03/08/93  1,224.00 76.50 
Poland SBA  03/08/93  04/08/94  476.00 357.00 
Poland SBA  08/05/94  03/04/96  545.00 * 
Czecho-Slovakia SBA  01/07/91  04/03/92  619.50 339.25 
Czecho-Slovakia SBA  04/03/92  12/31/92  236.00 36.00 
Czech Republic  SBA  03/17/93  03/16/94  177.00 70.00 
Slovakia SBA  07/22/94  01/21/96  116.00 * 
Bulgaria SBA  03/15/91  03/14/92  279.00 279.00 
Bulgaria SBA  04/17/92  04/16/93  155.00 124.00 
Bulgaria SBA  04/11/94  03/31/95  69.74 23.25 
Romania SBA  04/11/91  04/10/92  380.50 318.10 
Romania SBA  05/29/92  03/28/93  314.04 261.70 
Romania SBA  05/11/94  12/11/95  132.00 * 
Albania SBA  08/26/92  07/14/93  20.00 13.12 
Albania ESAF  07/14/93  07/13/96  42.36 16.94 
Estonia SBA  09/16/92  09/15/93  27.90 27.90 
Estonia SBA  10/27/93  03/26/95  11.63 2.33 
Latvia SBA  09/14/92  09/13/93  54.90 54.90 
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Latvia SBA  12/15/93  03/14/95  22.88  - 
Lithuania SBA  10/21/92  09/20/93  56.93  56.93 
Lithuania SBA  10/22/93  10/24/94  25.88  5.18 
Lithuania EFF  10/24/94  10/23/97  135.00  * 
Kazakhstan SBA  01/26/94  01/25/95  123.75  12.37 
Kyrgyzstan SBA  05/12/93  04/11/94  27.09  15.48 
Kyrgyzstan ESAF  07/20/94  07/19/97  71.00  0 
Moldova SBA  12/17/93  03/16/95  51.75  4.50 
Moldova  CCFF 1993  1993  13.50 13.50 
Mongolia SBA  10/04/91  12/31/92  22.50  16.25 
Mongolia ESAF  06/25/93  06/24/96  40.81  18.55 
TOTAL *  * * 8,154.87  3,307.25 
 
SBA - Stand-By Arrangement,  
EFF - Extended Fund Facility,  
ESAF - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility,  
CCFF - Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility 
 
Source: IMF Annual Reports and current data Marek Dąbrowski 
CASE Foundation  - 20 - 
 
Table 2: IMF Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) programs 1993-1994, in millions of SDRs 
Country  Purchase  Date of start  Amount  Connection 
with SBA 
Kyrgyzstan I  05/17/1993  16.125 YES 
Kyrgyzstan II  09/23/1993  16.125 YES 
Russia I  07/06/1993  1078.275 NO 
Russia II  04/25/1994  1078.275 NO 
Kazakhstan I  07/28/1993  61.875 NO 
Kazakhstan II  01/31/1994  61.875 YES 
Slovakia I  07/29/1993  64.350 NO 
Slovakia II  07/27/1994  64.350 YES 
Belarus I  08/02/1993  70.100 NO 
Moldova I  09/21/1993  22.500 NO 
Moldova II  12/22/1993  22.500 YES 
Lithuania I  10/27/1993  25.875 YES 
Lithuania II  04/13/1994  25.875 YES 
Estonia I  11/01/1993  11.625 YES 
Latvia I  12/20/1993  22.875 YES 
Latvia II  07/20/1994  22.875 YES 
Macedonia I  02/14/1994  12.400 NO 
Bulgaria I  04/14/1994  116.225 YES 
Romania I  05/16/1994  188.525 YES 
Croatia I  10/19/1994  65.400 YES 
Ukraine I  10/31/1994  249.325 NO 
Armenia I  12/19/1994  16.875 NO 
Georgia I  12/20/1994  27.750 NO 
TOTAL *  *  3,372.385 * 
 
Source: IMF data Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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Table 3: IBRD and IDA Import Financing Loans and Credits to Transition Countries (in 
millions of USD) 
Country  Loan type  Amount Date of 
approval 
Real disbursement after 
1 year in % 
Albania Critical  imports  43 VI.1992  22.0 
Belarus Rehabilitation  loan  120 XI.1993 14.7a 
Bulgaria SAL  250 VIII.1991 56.8 
Czecho-Slovakia SAL  450 VI.1991  44.4 
Estonia Rehabilitation  loan 30 X.1992  60.9 
Hungary SAL  200 VI.1990  100.0 
Hungary SAL  II  250 VI.1991  70.0 
Kazakhstan Rehabilitation  loan  180 IX.1993  41.5 
Kyrgyzstan Rehabilitation  loan  60 V.1993  60.3 
Latvia Rehabilitation  loan  45 X.1992  35.6 
Lithuania Rehabilitation  loan  60 X.1992  47.3 
Macedonia Recovery  loan  80 II.1994  100.0 
Moldova Rehabilitation  loan  60 X.1993  40.4a 
Poland SAL  300 VII.1990  33.3 
Romania Critical  imports  150 VI.1991  8.1 
Romania SAL  400 VI.1992  57.7 
Russia Rehabilitation  loan  600 VIII.1992  51.1 
Slovakia Recovery  loan  80 XI.1993  20.0 
Yugoslavia SAL  II  400 IV.1990  * 
TOTAL *  3,758 *  50.2 
a - 7 months; b - 9 months 
Source: Dervis, Selovsky, and Wallich [1994], p.3. + The World Bank data base Marek Dąbrowski 
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Table 4: The World Bank loans to transition countries, related to financial sector and 
restructuring (July 1989 to June 1994) in millions USD. 
Country  Name of loan  Date of 
approval 
Amount 
Hungary  Financial system modernization  IV.1990  66 
Poland  Agroindustrial exports development  II.1990  100 
Poland  Industrial export development  II.1990  260 
Poland  Financial institutions development  VI.1991  200 
Poland  Enterprise restructuring and privatiz  VI.1991  280 
Bulgaria  Private investment and exports  VI.1993  55 
Romania Industrial  development  V.1994  175 
Russia  Financial institution development  V.1994  200 
Russia Enterprise  restructuring  VI.1994  200 
Poland  Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustm.  V.1993  450 
Slovenia  Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustm.  VI.1993  80 
TOTAL *    2,066 
 
Source: Dervis, Selovsky, and Wallich [1994], p.32. + The World Bank data base. Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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Table 5: Other World Bank lending projects to transition countries (FY 1988 - 1994) in millions 
USD 
Country  Name of loan  Date of 
approval 
Amount 
Albania  Agriculture Sector Adjustment Credit  VI.1993  20.0 
Albania  Rural Poverty Alleviation  II.1993  2.4 
Albania Technical  Assistance  V.1993  4.0 
Albania  Transport / Infrastructure  V.1993  18.0 
Armenia Institution  Building  III.1993  12.0 
Armenia Earthquake  Reconstruction  II.1994  28.0 
Belarus Institution  Building  VII.1993  8.3 
Bulgaria  Technical Assistance   VI.1991  17.0 
Bulgaria Energy  III.1993  93.0 
Bulgaria Telecommunication  IV.1993  30.0 
Hungary Agroprocessing  V.1988  70.0 
Hungary  Industrial Sector Adjustment Loan  VI.1988  200.0 
Hungary Technology  I  VI.1988  50.0 
Hungary  Industrial Restructuring III  II.1989  140.0 
Hungary Energy  Development  V.1989  110.0 
Hungary Transport  II  III.1989  95.0 
Hungary  Integrated Agriculture Export  VI.1990  100.0 
Hungary Human  Resources  III.1991  150.0 
Hungary Telecommunication  II  X.1990  150.0 
Hungary  Enterprise Restruct. and Privatization  IV.1992  200.0 
Hungary  Product Market Development  VII.1992  100.0 
Hungary  Health Service Management  IV.1993  91.0 
Hungary  Pension Administration and Health Insurance  IV.1993  132.0 
Hungary  Tax Administration Reform  VII.1993  29.0 
Kazakhstan Technical  Assistance/ Institution Build.  VIII.1993  38.0 
Moldova  Emergency Drought Recovery  III.1993  26.0 
Poland Environmental  Management  IV.1990  18.0 
Poland  Energy Resources Development  VI.1990  250.0 
Poland Transport  V.1990  153.0 
Poland Agriculture  Development  VI.1991  100.0 
Poland  Heat Supply Restructuring  VI.1991  340.0 
Poland  Employment Promotion Services  VI.1991  100.0 
Poland Telecommunication  I  IV.1991  120.0 
Poland  Private Enterprise Development  V.1992  60.0 Marek Dąbrowski 
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Poland Health  V.1992  130.0 
Poland Housing  VI.1992  200.0 
Poland  Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan  V.1993  300.0 
Poland Roads  III.1993  150.0 
Poland  Forestry Development Project  VII.1993  146.0 
Romania  Private Farmer and Enterprise Support  VI.1992  100.0 
Romania  Health Service Rehabilitation  X.1991  150.0 
Romania Transport  IV.1993  120.0 
Russia Oil  Rehabilitation  VI.1993 610.0 
Russia  Highway Rehabilit. and Maintenance  II.1994  300.0 
Ukraine Institution  Building  VI.1993  27.0 
Yugoslavia Export  Industries  VI.1988  120.0 
Yugoslavia  Highway Sector II  X.1987  68.0 
Yugoslavia  Istria Water Supply  V.1989  60.0 
Yugoslavia Railways  VII  V.1989  138.0 
Yugoslavia Highways  Sec.III  VI.1990  292.0 
Yugoslavia  Kolubara B. Thermal Power  VI.1991  300.0 
TOTAL *  *  6,133.7 
 
Source: The World Bank data base. Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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Table 6: Official aid disbursement to the more advanced transition countries16 by donor 
countries, 1990-1993 
Year a  1990  1991  1992  1993  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Country  in millions USD  as % of donor’s GDP 
Australia 5.5  8.5 5.3 5.5 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Austria 85.3  289.9 406.6 389.1 0.05 0.18  0.22 0.21
Belgium 20.7  274.4 134.7 81.4 0.01 0.14  0.06 0.06
Canada 11.4  145.1 259.7 26.9 0.00 0.03  0.05 0.01
Denmark 14.7  65.1 82.0 175.5 0.01 0.05  0.06 0.14
Finland 17.0  118.5 49.9 38.5 0.01 0.10  0.05 0.05
France 75.6  457.0 363.8 605.6 0.01 0.04  0.03 0.05
Germany 473.2  2637.3 3344.4 (2416.0) 0.03 0.16  0.20 0.13
Ireland 4.7  15.3 (10.4) (8.6) 0.01 0.04  0.02 0.02
Italy 133.4  382.4 333.6 242.2 0.03 0.03  0.02
Japan  153.0  109.7 238.3 b 529.6 0.01 0.00  0.01 b 0.01
Luxembourg 0.7  4.5 5.2 ..  0.01 0.04  0.04 .. 
Netherlands 61.6  152.2 151.9 ..  0.02 0.05  0.05 .. 
New Zealand  -  0.7 0.9 0.8 - 0.00  0.00 0.00
Norway 21.1  24.6 79.2 76.7 0.02 0.02  0.07 0.08
Portugal 3.6  21.6 17.5 (13.9) 0.01 0.03  0.02 0.02
Spain 24.1  162.3 101.6 (86.6) 0.00 0.03  0.02 0.02
Sweden 2.4  107.5 349.8 (276.4) 0.00 0.05  0.15 0.15
Switzerland 9.1  124.5 125.5 237.4 0.00 0.05  0.05 0.10
UK 258.8  326.6 336.6 285.1 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.03
United States  338.0  1832.0 682.0 1217.0 0.01 0.03  0.01 0.02
TOTAL   1713.9  7259.7 7078.9 (6900.0) 0.01 0.04  0.04 (0.04)
Notes:  
a - all CEE, FSU excluded;  
b - all transition countries (including less devoloped); 
( ) - Incomplete or provisional data 
 
Source: OECD [1994a], table 2; OECD [1994b, table IV-4, p.85 and table 52, p.L1] 
                                                 
16 According to OECD definition this category includes  CEE countries, apart Albania and FY countries, 
Baltic countries, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Aid to all other transition countries is recorded together 
with the aid to devoloping countries and territories [see OECD, 1994b, p.L6). Marek Dąbrowski 
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Table 7: Major recipients of official aid disbursement from OECD countries (1991-1992) in % 
Region / Country  1991  1992 



















Table 8: Share of major components of official aid from the OECD countries to the transition 
countries (1991-1992), in %. 
Type of aid  1991  1992 
Project and program grants  15 30
Technical co-operation grants  8 13
Food aid  14 9
Other relief grants  6 5
Debt forgiveness  27 17
Loans (net)  2 5
Contribution to multilateral programs 28 21
TOTAL 100 100
Source: OECD [1994a], p.4 Western Aid Conditionality & Post-Communist Transition 
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